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In the Trinity Term of 1977 I had the privilege of hearing Michael Dum-
mett lecture in the Old Library at All Souls on the justification and
criticism of logical laws, and subsequently I also assisted Mark Helme
in the production of some unauthorised, not altogether successful, notes
on these lectures. I can vividly recall my surprise when Prof. Dum-
mett stated, in connection with the idea with which he had up till then
been mainly concerned, namely the idea that meaning is primarily de-
termined in terms of the Gentzen introduction rules, that my old tutor,
the Swedish logician Per Martin-Lof, in correspondence, held that "the
meanings of the logical constants CAN IN NO WAY be given by the in-
troduction rules, rather they are given by the elimination rules".1 This
was, as far as I knew from tutorials and conversations with Martin-Löf,
not a position he would defend at the time and certainly not today. In
fact, he has steadfastly held by the introduction-rule orthodoxy in all
relevant publications from 1979 onwards.2 Taken jointly those publi-
cations constitute, as far as I know, the only sustained effort towards
a realisation of a constructivist theory of meaning for a sizeable inter-
preted language serving the needs of pure mathematics on a scale com-
parable to that of Frege's Grundgesetze. From this circumstance alone
it seems clear that much of Dummettian interest can be found in the
works of Martin-Löf. Indeed, in my opinion, it would have been most
valuable if Prof. Dummett had found space for a confrontation with
some of Martin-Löf's views in his recent treatise on The Logical Basis of
1
 See p. 43 of the Helme notes. This is the text of a lecture given at the First
International Philosophy Conference, Mussomeli, Sicily, devoted to the philosophy of
Michael Dummett. The paper was written for oral delivery with Prof. Dummett in
the audience and that format has been retained in this published version,
2
 See [108], in [26]; [109] (notes from lectures delivered in 1980); [110], in: Atti degli
incontri di logica maiematica 2, Scuola di specializzazione in Logica Matematica,
Dipartimento di Matematica, Université di Siena 1985 (Notes from lectures delivered
in 1983); and especially: [111] (lecture delivered at the workshop Theories of meaning·
at the Villa di Mondeggi, Florence, 1985) and [112], in [27].
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Metaphysics.3 Alas, only a brief mention is made of Martin-Löf's posi-
tion and, unfortunately, in slightly erroneous terms.4 Accordingly, when
I received the kind invitation from the organisers of the present confer-
ence, my choice of topic was easy: a critical examination of Prof. Dum-
mett's views from the constructivist philosophical perspective outlined
in Martin-Lofs works. Many professed realists have felt it incumbent
upon themselves to offer criticisms of Prof. Dummett's anti-realism.
The present critical examination will be essayed from a less common
position: I largely share his constructivist inclinations and my points
belong inside the constructivist framework.
A discussion of Prof. Dummett's work will, as likely as not, take some
theme from within the Theory of Meaning as its point of departure and
the present exposition is no exception. In particular, I want to consider
his use of various mathematical theories of constructions as possible
blueprints for core theories in a meaning theory. Prof. Dummett refers
with approval to the work of Kreisel and Goodman,5 which is directed
towards a formalised
mathematical theory of constructions which should serve pre-
cisely the purpose of providing a semantical theory incorporat-
ing the intuitive explanations of the logical constants... [Tjhere
is no doubt that these standard intuitive explanations of the
logical constants determine their intended intuitionistic mean-
ings, so that anything which can be accepted as the correct
semantics for intuitionistic logic must be shown either to in-
corporate them or, at least, to yield them under suitable sup-
plementary assumptions.6
and furthermore he notes that
their efforts have not as yet been fully successful: if they had,
then we should undoubtedly have, in the theory of construc-
tions, what all would recognise as being the standard semantics
for intuitionistic logic in the same sense as that in which the
two-valued semantics is standard for classical logic.7
3
 Published by Duckworth, London, 1991.
4See [55], p. 280.
5The relevant works by Kreisel are: [91], in [116]; and [92], in [138] (especially
pages 119-133); and by Goodman his doctoral dissertation [73] and later papers
derived from it.
6See [47], p. 389. Hereinafter this work will be cited as E. of I..
7See [55], p. 27. Given that these efforts are, by now, more than twenty years
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The efforts of Kreisel (and consequently also those of Goodman, which
derive from Kreisel's) have a chequered pre-history which one might con-
veniently start in 1837, when Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre appeared in
four mighty tomes. Here a radical break with the logical tradition is
carried out: the traditional 'Aristotelian' two-term form of judgement
S is P
is rejected in favour of a more simple form
A is true
where A is a propositional content (a Satz an sich in the terminology
of Bolzano). Frege, probably in complete independence from Bolzano,
used what comes down to the same form, and thus there is no advance
to be found in the works of Frege regarding the form of judgement:
his brilliant innovative insight is concerned with the propositional con-
tent of the judgements, which he analysed in terms of the mathematical
function/argument structure, whereas Bolzano had just transformed (a
version of) the Aristotelian form of judgement into the form of content
(object) A has (property) b.
It must be stressed, though, that the notion of truth that is involved
in this form of judgement, was left essentially unanalysed by Frege: in-
deed, in Der Gedanke he even claims truth to be indefinable.
There are two traditional principles which play a central role in the
interplay between logic and epistemology. The first is, of course, the law
of Excluded Middle, or for that matter, as Prof. Dummett, more than
anyone else has made us aware, the law of Bivalence. The other prin-
ciple, which is as time-honoured as that of Bivalence, is that principle
to which Prof. Dummett has referred as K, presumably for knowledge:
if a proposition is true, then it is in principle possible to know that it
old, it seems safe to conclude that we are not going to learn more from either Kreisel
or Goodman about the theory of constructions. Accordingly, the above passage of
Prof. Dummett's is slightly misleading in creating, as it does, the impression that
both authors are still hot in pursuit of the one true theory of constructions. Indeed,
since that time, the main efforts have been at the hands of others, but Martin-Löf is
the only author who has pursued the theme with vigour and persistence.
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is true.8 It is only in 1908 that the tension between this principle of
Knowability and that of Bivalence is felt, simultaneously in two differ-
ent places, namely Cambridge and Amsterdam. G.E. Moore is the first
to contemplate unknowably true propositions in view of the fact that, as
a Realist, he could not allow for the abolition of the law of Bivalence.9
L.E.J. Brouwer, on the other hand, took the opposite way out in his
reaction to this dilemmatic tension and chose to retain the principal
knowability of truth, but had then to refrain from acknowledging the
law of Bivalence, and the ensuing law of Excluded Middle, in their full
generality.10
The next (and here I deliberately ignore Russell's works on the the-
ory of judgement)11 step in the development towards the theories of
construction was taken by Wittgenstein in the Tractât us through a
consequent application of a maxim which Prof. Dummett has labelled
Principle C (for correspondence), namely the principle that if a propo-
sition is true there must be something in virtue of which it is true.12
In other words, when a proposition is true, there is a 'truth-maker' for
the proposition in question.13 The Tractarian analysis of truth is well-
known: a proposition presents a certain Sacbverhalt (state of affairs)
and the proposition is true if the relevant state of affairs exists and false
otherwise.14 Thus we may say that the Tractatus provides the paradigm
for how an extreme logical realist might construe the truth-maker anal-
ysis of truth.
Roughly ten years after Wittgenstein's realist analysis of the concept
8
 See [46], in [58], p. 99. I have slightly changed the formulation of K. Prof.
Dummett formulates his principle for statements rather than for propositions, pre-
sumably so as not to be bothered by the charge of neglecting the phenomena of
indexicality. Since I am mainly concerned with the language of mathematics this
is a worry to which I can safely assign a low priority. Furthermore, since the term
'statement' is heavily overburdened in contemporary philosophical logic — it has
been used (though not by Prof. Dummett) for the act of judgement/assertion, the
judgement passed/assertion made, the propositional content, the sentence expressing
the propositional content, and the state of affairs that serves as truth-maker for the
proposition when it is true — it seems prudent to avoid it altogether and bite the
bullet of indexicality in some other way.
9See [113], reprinted in [114].
10
 See [20].
11
 Interesting and relevant information on Russell can be found in [95].
12M. Dummett, Ibid., p. 89.
13See [115].
14See [166], §§2.202, 2.21 and 4.021.
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of truth, Arend Heyting offers an anti-realist analysis, also by means of
an application of the Principle C: if a proposition is true, then there
exists a proof of the proposition.15 The further vicissitudes of the re-
alist applications of the Principle C in Tarski's theory of truth and the
ensuing model-theoretic notion of 'semantics' has to be left for another
occasion; it is Heyting's use of the proofs of propositions to provide
systematic meaning-explanations that is of main concern to us now.16
Heyting construes his propositions with explicit reference to the phe-
nomenological tradition of Edmund Husserl, in the particular shape of
the book by Oskar Becker on Mathematische Existenz.17 Accordingly, a
proposition is, or expresses, an Intention towards a mathematical object,
namely a construction that proves the proposition. The proposition is
true if the Intention can be fulfilled, or realised, that is, if there exists
a certain construction which satisfies certain conditions, depending on
the proposition in question. In particular, it seems clear that one has
to take two notions of proof into account to do justice to Heyting's for-
mulations, given their specific, phenomenological background. Thus the
proofs of propositions, in terms of which propositions are explained, as
when one says that the conjunction Α Λ Β of the propositions A and Β
is a proposition which has got constructions (a, 6) as its proofs, where a
is a proof of A and b is a proof of B, are objects and, as such, the objects
of acts of construction. The proof, on the other hand, in the sense of
that through which one gets to know the truth of a proposition, that is,
the proof of a judgement/assertion of the form
A is true,
is not an object, but an act. In this latter sense we must allow that
Brouwer is perfectly right in his claim that mathematical proofs (like
any other proofs, in fact) are mental acts.18 Thus, given that, according
15
 [83] and the famous Königsberg address [84] are the two important Hey ting-
papers here. In my [150], I have dealt at some length with Heyting's formulations
and how they should best be read.
16In [153], invited contributed paper at the IXth International Conference on Logic,
Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Uppsala, August 1991, and intended for a
special volume of such invited papers, I offer a further examination of the later
versions of the realistapplication of Principle C.
17
 See [8], also as a separate study, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 2nd edition 1973.
18Prof. Dummett's well-known argument against realism can be squared with this
Brouwerian opinion, if we recall that Brouwer was writing during the period when
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to Heyting, one is only allowed to claim the existence of a proof of the
proposition A on the basis of having found one, it holds that the form
of the theorem proved by the act of proof, when fully elucidated, will be
c is a proof of A,
where c is the construction found in the act of construction/proof. Heyt-
ing is insistent that the assertion of a proposition A is not itself prepo-
sitional in nature and consequently, on his view, the relation between
construction-object and proposition could not be prepositional.19 In
conclusion we can clearly state that Heyting's use of the Principle C
conforms to the semantic principle that meaning is given via truth-
conditions: you explain the meaning of propositions in terms of truth,
but the notion of truth in its turn is construed according to the construc-
tivist reading of the Principle C. A proposition A is true, if a proof-object
exists as demanded by the proposition. Here the notion of existence has
to be taken constructively. Thus one would only claim the existence of
such a proof-object on the basis of actually having carried out the act
of construction whereby one was found.20
Kreisel and Goodman have cast their theories very much in the style
of a standard first order theory with one single Fregean, or Scotist (after
Duns Scotus), universe that serves as the range of definition, respec-
tively of significance, for the functions and predicates of their respective
theories. In particular, for each given proposition A, the proof-relation
a psychologistic view of the mental prevailed. The stress that Prof. Dummett lays
on the outward manifestation of knowledge and other prepositional attitudes, can
be seen as an application of the Wittgensteinian insight that the external anchoring
in a form of life of our mental acts is primary to their internal aspects. Again,
the same point can be applied also to accommodate Oskar Becker's use of Husserl's
meaning-giving and other acts in the theory of meaning.
19This account of Heyting is based on a close reading of the Erkenntnis article from
1931. The last point concerning the non-propositional status of the proof-relation
may be inferred from Heyting, but is not explicitly stated in his text. Obviously, the
absence of the inference in the text does not plead for my reading. It does, however,
not plead against the reading either, since there was really no reason for him to
draw such an inference, given his immediate concerns. In Prof. Dummett's writings
the act/object distinction with reference to proofs is generally not dealt with and,
accordingly, not applied.
20For further elaboration of these ideas, see the discussion of the judgement
a exists
in connection with the Fifth Vestige of Realism.
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among constructions is construed as an ordinary prepositional function
which has to be decidable in the sense that the following scheme should
hold:21
On the mathematical side this was motivated by the primitive recursive-
ness of the (Gödelized) proof-predicates for standard formal systems,
whereas the philosophical motivation was given in terms of the slogan
We recognise a proof when we see one.
Prof. Dummett has been a staunch upholder of the decidability of
proof-relations throughout his writings on anti-realist matters, and I
here confine myself only to a very recent quote professing adherence to
this doctrine:
a proposition is a decidable classification of constructions (into
those that are and those that are not proofs of the statement).22
This reads very well as a meaning-theoretical version of Kreisel 's opinion
that
[t]he sense of a mathematical assertion denoted by a linguistic
object A is intuitionistically determined (or understood) if we
have laid down what constructions constitute a proof of A, i.e.
if we have a construction TA such that, for any construction c,
TA(C) — 0 if c is a proof of A and r^(c) = 1 if c is not a proof
of A.23
21
 Kreisel uses a certain three-place predicate which specialises to the present use.
The present use of the Π-predicate simplifies matters with respect to Kreisel's theory,
but not misleadingly so.
22See [55], p. 29. In my [150], p. 155, a retrospective list of places is given where
Prof. Dummett insists on the decidability of the proof-relation. Here, 1 take it, either
the use of 'statement' or of 'proposition' must be just as a slip of the pen.
23
 See [91], p. 201. The gist of the quote is clear: the TA construction is the charac-
teristic function of the proof relation with respect to the proposition A. The detailed
meaning poses fascinating problems of interpretation, though. Do assertions have
sense? Is it not rather the proposition expressed by the linguistic object A, the utter-
ance of which could be used to make an assertion, which is the sense of the expression
(= linguistic object?)? Furthermore, does the understanding of a proposition presup-
pose the idea of the characteristic function of the proof-predicate for the proposition
in question? Is not that an extra idea, namely the idea of definitions of functions by
cases, over and above the idea of a proof of the proposition and the recognition of
what constructions can serve to prove the proposition in question? These questions
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Kreisel has always had a fondness for the philosophical point well put in
terms of an obiter dictum.24 One of his best efforts in this vein was cast
in the shape of a question:
Was the (logical) language of current intuitionistic systems ob-
tained by uncritical transfer from languages which were, tacitly,
understood classically?25
Concerning Kreisel's own early formulations of his theories of construc-
tions, with their concomitant remarks on the decidability of the proof-
relation, it seems to me that the answer to this most pertinent question
has to be a resounding YES. This remark would rebound on Kreisel
on the (meta)mathematical level concerning his formalism, but Prof.
Dummett, whose philosophical, meaning-theoretical remarks are based
on the metamathematical formulations of Kreisel, stands as open to the
implicit charge in Kreisel's Question as Kreisel does. Accordingly this is
where I want to mark the First vestige of realism in Prof. Dummett's
work: the proof-predicate is viewed as a, more or less standard, preposi-
tional function over a unified Scotist universe of constructions, but this
is not the only way to read the dictum "We recognise a proof when we
see one". Indeed, one of the most attractive features of the Philosophy
of Logic offered in Wittgenstein's Tractaius (6.113) is its insistence on
the mechanical calculability from the symbol itself of various properties.
My suggestion is now that this is the right way to view the decidability
of the proof-relation: given a symbol, it must be possible by means of
mechanical, syntactic, calculation on the sign alone, to decide whether
or not the given symbol is a proof of a certain proposition, and in the
type theory of Per Martin-Löf this is indeed the case.26 He explicitly
may serve to underline the intricacies that are commonly inherent in the standard
writings on the borderline between (meta)-mathematics, foundations of mathematics
and the philosophy of language (meaning theory).
24Prof. Dummett has given wide currency to Kreisel's dictum: "The point is not
the existence of mathematical objects, but the objectivity of mathematical state-
ments" (See [50], pp. xxviii and 228, and many other places), concerning which
questions were set in the B.phil. examinations during my time at Oxford. Prof.
Dummett refers to a review of Wittgenstein for the quote in question. What Kreisel
states in footnote 1 on p. 138 of his review of Wittgenstein's 'Remarks on the Founda-
tions of Mathematics', in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. no.
9, 1958, is that "Wittgenstein argues against a mathematical object (presumably:
substance), but, at least in places [...] not against the objectivity of mathematics,
especially through the recognition of formal facts". Se non è vero, è ben trovato...
25See [93], in [154], p. 268.
261 here would like to withdraw the tentative remarks I made as to the possible
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opts for a Russellian, or Thomistic, typed universe in which every object
belongs to a category (Aristotle) [ type (Russell), sort (Locke)], or falls
under a universal (general concept) (Thomas Aquinas), depending on
which terminology one might prefer.
Martin-Löf returns to the basic traditional form of judgement
is
referred to above, but adds some extra twists, taking the later devel-
opments from Bolzano onwards into account. The form of judgement is
now
a: a,
in words, 'a is an object of category a'. As Prof. Dummett has stressed,
it is not enough to know these application-conditions in order to know a
category of entities; one must also know the identity-conditions (or cri-
teria) for objects of the category in question.27 Accordingly, Martin-Lof
also operates with a second basic form of judgement, namely
α = b: a,
in words, 'a and b are equal objects of category a'. A particularly im-
portant category is the category of sets. The application criterion for
set is that in order to know an element of this category, that is in order
to know a set, one must know how canonical elements of the set may be
formed and, secondly, when two canonical elements of the set are equal
elements of the set in question. The identity condition, or criterion, for
the category set is that two sets A and B are equal elements of the cat-
egory set, when canonical elements of one are canonical elements of the
other and vice versa, and equal canonical elements of the one are equal
canonical elements of the other, and vice versa. In other words,
A = B: set
when the rules
semi-decidability of proofs in my [152], in [65], vol. VIII, Ch. 111:8, p. 493.
"See [41].
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and
a: A
a:B
a = b:A
as well as their inverses, are correct for canonical objects. According
to the so called propositions-as-types doctrine, which is nothing but a
precise version of Heyting's notion of proposition as explained above,
one now defines
prop = set: cat,
that is, the category of propositions is nothing but the category of sets.
In this way every proposition is viewed as a set, namely as the set of its
proof-objects and conversely a set is viewed as a proposition, namely as
the proposition which is proved by exhibiting an element of the set, that
is the proposition which has the elements of the given set as its proof-
objects.28 In essence Martin-Löf's work can be seen as a sustained effort
to develop a sizeable mathematical language from this fundamental idea,
and its, by now quite considerable, philosophical elaboration. Thus he
can be characterised, in terms first introduced by Sir Isaiah Berlin, as
a hedgehog who knows that he is a hedgehog, that is a thinker whose
work is guided by one basic idea that is worked out over a wide field and
in great depth.29
In order to make the above abstract explanations slightly more man-
ageable I will consider the well-known example of conjunction. There
are four sorts of rules involved here, namely Formation, Introduction,
Elimination, and Equality rules. The rule of Λ-Formation states that
Α Λ Β is a proposition, when A and Β are both propositions, in symbols
A : prop, Β : prop
Α Λ Β : prop
The rule of A-Introduction gives meaning to this rule by laying down
how canonical elements of the set Α Λ Β may be formed:
28See [86], in [141].
29See [12], According to Berlin, Tolstoy was a hedgehog who thought he was a fox,
that is a thinker who explores many ideas along various avenues of thought.
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and
a : A, b : B
(a, b): Α λ Β
a = a' : A, b = 6' : B
that is, given proof-objects for A, respectively B, their ordered pair is
a canonical proof-object for the proposition Α Λ Β. Once the meaning
of conjunction has been laid down via this meaning-giving rule other
aspects of the use of conjunction may be justified. Thus, for instance,
the Λ-Elimination rules
c:A/\B
P(c) : A
and
q(c) : Β
are correct, where ρ and q are the left, respectively right, projections,
obeying the following Α-Equality rules that serve to give substance to
the Elimination rules in the same way that the Introduction rule gave
substance to the Formation rule:30
30
 In fact, in order to ensure the required syntactic decidability of the proof-relation,
some additional type information needs to be included in the proof-objects. Thus
the Introduction rule should properly read
α : A, b:B
Λί(Α,Β,ο,6) : Α Λ Β
and the Equality rule
c: ΑΛΒ
= a : A'
Note that the additional type-information is not of the 'second clauses' kind, well-
known from the writings of Kreisel and Goodman and their followers. The second
clauses introduce constructions that have to prove that the functions involved in
the explanations of implication and the universal quantifier really do what they are
supposed to do. Thus the second construction will have to be a proof-object for a
proposition of the form
c:A,
but this is impossible, since the proof-relation is not a prepositional function, an
option I share with Heyting, Scott and Martin-Löf. The most important reason is
that one gets caught in an infinite regress of ever descending meaning-explanations,
somewhat along the same line as the regress-argument offered by Frege against the
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and
a: A, b:B
p ( ( a , b ) ) = a :A
a: A, b:B
p ( ( a , b ) ) = b:B'
We should note here that this way of presenting propositions in terms
of their canonical proof-objects allows us to illuminate some of the re-
marks that Prof. Dummett makes concerning the meaning of implica-
tion:
A proof of A —> B is a construction of which we can recognise
that, applied to a proof of A, it yields a proof of B. Such an
operation is therefore an operation carrying proofs into proofs.
Note that it would be incorrect to characterise .. .a proof of
A —> B as 'a construction which transforms every proof of A
into a proof of B' since we should then have no right to suppose
that we could effectively recognise a proof whenever we were
presented with one. We therefore have to require explicitly
that a construction is to count as a proof of ... A —+ B only if
we can recognise it as effecting the required transformation of
proofs of A into proofs of B.31
This worry that the implication (and Universal quantifier) should some-
how demand more of the constructions serving as their proof-objects
than, for instance, conjunction is in my opinion entirely misplaced. From
the first line of this quote it is clear that proofs of implications can be ap-
plied to other proofs; thus, here we are dealing with proof-objects rather
than proof-acts. For any proposition, be it an implication, a conjunction
or what have you, it must be possible to recognise its proof-objects as
such (and this am Symbol allein as argued above). This property has to
be ensured through the way in which the relevant proof-object is given
(the act of proof/construction).
Furthermore, the alleged impredicativity of implication is also taken
care of when we explain propositions via their canonical proof-objects.32
correspondence theory of truth in Der Gedanke. The proof that the construction
does what it is supposed to do is not itself a construction object, but rather the act
of proof/construction whereby the construction object is given. See my paper, Ibid..
31
 See [47], p. 13.
32See [47], p. 394 ff..
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For instance, in a canonical proof-object (a, 6) for a conjunction A A B
the proof-objects a and b need not themselves be canonical. It must,
however, be possible to evaluate them to canonical form by means of
syntactical calculation alone. Herein lies a way to block the vicious
circularity of meaning-explanations that threatens in the case of impli-
cation (negation, universal quantification). Prof. Dummett imposes a
stratification of the universe of constructions in terms of the complexity
of the propositions they prove, and the function which transforms proofs
of A into proofs of B only has to be denned for proofs of complexity less
than or equal to that of A.33 This, however, does not do justice to the
fact that one would like the function f which serves to prove the proposi-
tion A —* B to be denned on any proof of A, irrespective of complexity.
This we can effect by using the standard clause
f is a proof of the proposition A —*· B
iff
f(a) is a proof of B, provided a is a proof of A.
This clause takes any proof of A into account, using whatever meth-
ods of proof one might think of, including the elimination rule for im-
plication, provided only that they are valid, that is, provided that the
proofs obtained by means of these principles are évaluable to canoni-
cal form. This provides one with a way to have one's cake and eat it
too: when defining the function f, I only need to consider arguments in
canonical form, and with this the impredicativity is also taken care of.
Note, however, that the parallel between canonical proofs and normal
derivations is lost. A canonical proof does not necessarily have canoni-
cal parts: it is just a proof ending with anapplication of an introduction
rule, (canonical proofs are proofs on I-form.) A normal derivation, on
the other hand, will have only normal parts and so it will have a sort of
sub-formula property and thus impose a stratification on derivations.34
Prof. Dummett remarks that
because of the peculiarities of the intuitionistic interpretation
33M. Dummett, Ibid..
34
 Presumably this is the origin of Prof. Dummett,'s stratification of proofs, canon-
ical and non-canonical. Another possible source is Goodman's use of a stratified
universe of construction in his thesis (Ibid.). For the record, the impredicativity also
shows that one should not construe the proof-clauses quantificationally, that is the
reference to all constructions should not be effected through the universal quantifier.
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of —>, provability is not a stable property: we cannot think of
an addition to our stock of methods of proof as merely allowing
us to prove more than we could before, while all the proofs we
had already given remain intact, since such an addition may
lead to a rejection of certain earlier proofs.35
I cannot endorse this view: one only needs to insist that the additional
methods of proof are correct, in the sense that it must be possible to
evaluate proofs obtained by means of them to canonical form, in order
to ensure that the old proofs remain proofs and that provability is a
stable notion.36
Furthermore, we can now easily deal with the problem of defining ±.
Prof. Dummett is of the opinion that we can always choose J_ to be
equal to Id(N, 0, I).37 This, however, only works well for the case of
arithmetic where the intuitionistic ±-rule is derivable for Id(N, 0, 1),
under essential use of the principle of induction. If the language should
comprise other types of propositions than merely those of arithmetic, the
above method for deriving the intuitionistic J_-rule will not work and it
is not at all obvious that the proposition Id(N, 0, 1) will serve in the role
of JL. A better approach is to define the absurd proposition which has no
canonical proof-objects. This is perfectly legitimate on the propositions-
as-sets (of proof-objects) conception. One will then have to show in the
context of arithmetic that any proof-object for the proposition Id(N, 0,
1) can be transformed into one for _L, that is, one will have to derive the
fourth Peano axiom.
We should note that the identity criterion for sets offered above, es-
sentially in terms of co-extensionality, induces one for propositions via
the formal identification of the two categories set and prop. This cri-
terial, intensional, identity for propositions is completely determined
hereby: roughly speaking, two propositions are equal when they have
the same proof-objects. Hence a solution has been given to a problem
Quine claimed was unsolvable, namely the problem of providing a precise
definition of identity between propositions, or, equivalently, of sameness
of meaning or synonymy. The price one has to pay for this extensional
treatment of an intensional identity relation is that the notion of ob-
35
 See [47], p. 402.
36
 See also below on Martin-Lofs discussion of truth from a constructivist
standpoint.
37See [47], p. 13. For an explanation of the ld(N, x, y) conception of identity, see
the next paragraph but one.
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ject is an intensional one, owing to the use of the distinction between
canonicaland non-canonical ways of giving the objects.
This topic is also of relevance for the constructivist treatment of iden-
tity. As already stressed above Martin-Lofs universe is a typed, or cat-
egorised, one. When using such a universe it is certainly reasonable to
accept Russell's doctrine of types in the form that each propositional
function has a certain category as its range of significance. This must
hold also for the propositional function of equality Id(A, x, y) with re-
spect to the set A. The constant Id has the formation rule
α : A, b : A
Id(A,a,b) : prop'
with proof-objects formed according to the introduction rule
a: A
r(a) : Id(A,a,a)'
The corresponding elimination rule must, of course, be a version of Leib-
niz's law. It is important to realise here that the identity-criteria for the
set A cannot be given in terms of the propositional function Id(A, x, y).
This can be seen as follows: the identity criteria are given in terms of
criterial identity, and thus this notion is conceptually prior to the set A
itself, since A is given in terms of it. The set A, on the other hand, is
conceptually prior to the propositional function of identity regarding its
elements. The same type of reasoning can also be used concerning the
proof relation between proposition and proof, which, for basically the
same reasons, namely, the respective conceptual priorities, will not be a
propositional function.
Prof. Dummett discusses the notion of criterial identity in various
guises, e.g. 'strict' or 'intensional' identity.38 He stresses that the no-
tion must be decidable and expresses this decidability by means of the
38See[55], p. 125, resp. [47], pp. 25-26.
152 GORAN SUNDHOLM
formula39
x = y V -ix =
This, however, treats of intensional identity as a prepositional function,
which it is not. The decidability involved here is not that of a preposi-
tional function which, constructively or non-constructively, either is, or
is not, applicable to each pair of arguments, but rather that of recogniz-
ability am Symbol allein, that served above also to ensure the decidabil-
ity of the proof-relation: that is, given two objects s and t in category a,
we can, on the level of syntactic reflection, check mechanically whether
or not they are intension ally equal by means of syntactic, mechanical,
calculation on the expressions 's' and 't' alone. Indeed, when we know
that
s — t : a,
that is, when s and t are criterially, or intensionally, equal, then clearly,
on the level of syntactic reflection, the expressions 's' and 't' are defini-
tionally equal, that is, they express intensionally equal objects of cate-
gory a, and vice versa. As Prof. Dummett himself observes, the objects
of intuitionistic mathematics are intensional objects, and therefore their
identity is sensitive to the way in which they are presented. In the quan-
tified proposition used by Prof. Dummett to express the decidability of
strict identity, free variables occur in the quantified matrix that is meant
to express strict identity. The notion of strict identity, however, does not
really make sense when applied between variables, since variables present
no objects and therefore, on the level of syntactic reflection, one cannot
carry out the necessary calculations on the symbols alone.40 Accord-
39See [47], p. 28. In [41], p. 632, Prof. Dummett treats of this decidability in
the guise of the decidability of the equality of sense and attributes this principle to
Frege:
Sense is so conceived by Frege that synonymy must be an effectively decid-
able relation: if the senses of two expressions are the same, and someone
knows the sense of each expression, then he must know that they have the
same sense.
ƒ
40In the Begriffsschrift Frege treats 'Inhaltsgleichheit', definitional identity between
expressions, much in the same way that Prof. Dummett treated strict identity in (*).
It is well-known, however, that several of the formulae in the Begrißsschrift that
involve identity do not make sense since they presuppose that definitional identity is
treated as a prepositional function (which it is not) and that its argument places are
open to free variables and theapplication of quantification. Prof. Dummett treats of
the matter in [41], p. 544.
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ingly the treatment of intensional identity in the formula (*) constitutes
a Second vestige of Realism in Prof. Dummett's work.
Furthermore, a Third vestige of Realism can be found in his use of
the realist notion of a state of affairs: this notion, classically, for instance
in Wittgenstein's Tractatus and in Husserl, serves the role of preposi-
tional truth-maker, and as such it is also treated by Prof. Dummett. In
particular, Prof. Dummett holds that it must be decidable, or 'determi-
nate, for any recognisable states of affairs, whether or not that state of
affairs shows [a certain] assertion to have been correct'.41 It is, however,
hard to see how the notion of state of affairs makes sense constructively,
since it is the realist key notion par excellence. Indeed, the decidability,
or determinateness, in question is readily transformed into the construc-
tive decidability of the notion of equality between propositions, that is,
when
A: prop
and
B: prop
both are given, it is decidable am Symbol allein, whether or not
A = B: prop.
The constructive validity of this principle allows one to put the decid-
ability argument against classical logic in a particularly attractive form.
Consider the type of explication offered for the universal quantifier by
Frege in the Begriffsschrift. There we find an explanation which runs as
follows when the domain of quantification has been made explicit:
(V* : A)B(x) = T : prop, if B(a) = T: prop, for all a:A,
(Vsc : A)B(x) = F : prop, otherwise,
and, as is well-known, we shall in general not be able to calculate me-
chanically which of two alternatives will hold when the set A is infinite.
Thus definitional (intensional) equality between sentences (propositions)
will turn out to be non-decidable on this classical view that puts the set
41
 See [46], in [58], pp. 120-123, especially p. 121.
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of propositions equal to the two Boolean truth values {T, F}.42
The Fourth relevant vestige of Realism in Prof. Dummett's work
concerns the same principle, but now for names.43 Thus, for an object
and a name it must be decidable whether the term refers to the given
object or not. Also this realist principle can be accounted for construc-
tively in terms of the mechanical decidability, am Symbol allein, of the
notion of definitional identity between objects of a category, that is when
and
it is decidable whether or not44
α : a
a
a = b : a,
The final vestige of realism in Prof. Dummett's work, that I shall deal
with, is concerned with the intuitionist notion of truth. Prior to the dis-
cussion of this notion, a terminological clarification and recommendation
might not be out of place. In my opinion, 'constructivism' deserves by
far the preference above 'intuitionism' as an appellation for the sort of
mathematics to which Prof. Dummett is attracted. Indeed, Hey ting
gives no meaning-explanations for typically intuitionist notions such as
choice sequences or propositions involving the creative subject and, as
Troelstra observes, it is uncertain, whether the Brouwerian notion of
choice sequence permits a molecular meaning theory of the sort envis-
aged by Prof. Dummett.45. Furthermore, the intuitionisi doctrine of
421 owe this way of viewing the matter to Dr. Aarne Hanta of the Academy of
Finland. One could also refine Frege's position to let the prop's consist not of the
truth-values themselves but let them be expressions which can be evaluated to such
truth-values. In this case the evaluation-function will be incalculable.
43Strictly speaking, this is not a vestige of realism in Prof. Dummett's work, but,
rather, a feature of realism discussed in his works. I have chosen to include it on my
list simply because of its being the exact analogue of the corresponding principle for
states of affairs and propositions that was discussed above. Cf, also the following
footnote.
441 hesitate to attribute the present principle to Prof. Dummett. It is discussed in
[41], Ch. 14, but then only as an important principle, and perhaps not as something
Prof. Dummett would uphold himself. Similarly, there is a relevant passage in [46],
in [58], pp. 135-136.
45See [158] in [27]. See also my paper, Ibid., pp. 163-164. The remarks that
Prof. Dummett makes on the elimination of choice sequences and the meaning of the
quantifiers, [47], pp. 450-451, are clearly relevant here.
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the languagelessness of mathematics seems very hard to square philo-
sophically with Prof. Dummett's meaning-theoretical concerns.46
Turning now to the constructivist, or (in order to stay with Prof.
Dummett's terminology) irituitionistic notion of truth, the following
scheme might serve as a starting point for the discussion:
the proposition A is true
there exists a proof for A.
First we note that, as was already remarked above in connection with
Heyting's work, this is also an application of the general truth-maker
analysis of truth, in accordance with Prof. Dummett's Principle C. As
was also remarked, 'proof' can here be taken in two senses. The first
of these would take proof in the sense of the mental act which confers
evidence on the judgement
A is true,
and the existence would here have to be actual existence in the sense
that someone had carried out such a mental act. The ensuing notion of
truth, however, would not be a pleasant one, since such natural clauses as
the proposition A V B is true
iff
A is true or B is true
would no longer be correct. Indeed, notoriously, one can have carried out
a constructive proof of A V B without yet having carried out such a proof
for either of the two disjuncts.47 Thus it seems a more promising line
46
 See my paper [151].
47Prof. Dummett's formulation, in [47], p. 12, of the meanings of conjunction and
disjunction is slightly out of focus, it seems to me: "A proof of A&.B is anything
that is a proof of A and B", "A proof of A V B Is anything that is a proof either
of A or of B". This means that a proof of a conjunction will have to be a proof of
three propositions, namely the conjunction and the two conjuncts, and similarly a
proof of a disjunction will have to be a proof of at least two propositions, namely
the disjunction itself and one of its disjuncts. This would be most counter-intuitive,
since the proof would not determine its conclusion: from the proof one could not
read off what it is a proof of and that is hardly acceptable.
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to read the above elucidation of truth in terms of proof-objects rather
than in terms of proof-acts. The first thing which must be stressed then,
though, is that the notion of existence involved cannot be that of the
existential quantifier, since that quantifier, being itself essentially prepo-
sitional in nature, will itself be explained in terms of the truth-conditions
for existential-quantifier propositions, and these truth-conditions are all
formulated in terms of the relevant notion of existence, which thus, on
pain of a vicious conceptual circularity, will have to be different from
that of the propositional notion of existence as expressed by the quan-
tifier. The notion of existence involved here is that of the existence of a
general concept: when α is a general concept (category), then
a exists
is a judgement. In order to explain a novel form of judgement, one
has to explain what knowledge is expressed by a judgement of the form
in question, that is, one must explain what one has to know in order to
have the right to make the judgement.48 In the particular case of the
judgement
a exists,
what one must know, in order to have the right to make it, is that an
object falls under the concept a, that is one must have made a judgement
,
a: a.
Truth is then readily explained in terms of existence of a proof-object:
when A is a proposition, that is, when it is known what a proof-object
of A has to be, one simply puts
A is true
48Cf. [110], p. 227:
What is a judgement before it has become evident, or known? That is, of
the two, judgement and evident judgement, how is the first to be defined?
The characteristic of a judgement in this sense is merely that it has been
laid down what knowledge is expressed by it, that is, what you must know
in order to have the right to make, or utter, it.
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the concept
proof-object for A
exists.
These elaborations may serve as background to Prof. Dummett's valu-
able discussion of these matters:
To say this is, in effect, to equate 'A is true' with 'We can
prove A' rather than with 'A has been proved', and 'A is false'
with 'We cannot prove A'. Such an interpretation of 'true' and
'false' remains faithful to the basic principles of intuitionism
only if 'We can prove A' (A is provable) is not interpreted
to mean, either at one extreme, that, independently of our
knowledge, there exists something which, if we became aware
of it, we should recognise as a proof of A, nor, at the other, that
as a matter of fact we either have proved A or shall at some
time prove it. In the former case, we should be appealing to a
platonistically conceived objective realm of proofs; in the latter
we should be entitled to deny that A was provable on non-
mathematical grounds (e.g. if the obliteration of the human
race were imminent). 'We can prove A' must be understood
as being rendered true only by our actually proving A, but as
being rendered false only by our finding a purely mathematical
obstacle to proving it. From any standpoint, therefore, there
can again, be no guarantee that every mathematical statement
is either true or false.49
For a constructivist it is somewhat of a disappointment, in the light
of this insightful passage, to see that Prof. Dummett does not always
remain faithful to these ideas. In his 'Reply to Prawitz' we find the
following:
How should we explain the 'can' in 'can be verified'(?) ... An
untensed use of 'is true' is no doubt admissible: but then it
should genuinely be in tense of timelessness, and not in that
49See [47], p. 19. Indeed, the whole section 1.2 entitled 'The Meaning of the Logical
Constants' is, with the exception given in footnote 47, a most impressive piece. It
is noteworthy how Prof. Dummett (rightly) rejects the application of what Lovejoy
dubbed 'The principle of Plenitude' with respect to provability, that is, possibility of
finding a proof: it is not so that every possibility must have been actualised in the
future.
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of eternity; 'is' ought not to be read as 'always was and al-
ways will be'. There is a well-known difficulty about thinking
of mathematical proofs — and equally, of verifications of em-
pirical statements — as existing independently of our hitting
on them, which insisting that they are proofs we are capable
of grasping or of giving fails to resolve. Namely, it is hard
to see how the equation of falsity of a statement (the
truth of its negation) with the non-existence of a proof
or verification can be resisted: but, then, it is equally
hard to see how, on this conception of the existence of
proofs, we can resist supposing that a proof of a state-
ment determinately either exists or fails to exist. We
shall then have driven ourselves into a realist position, with a
justification of bivalence.50
The boldface passage just given constitutes the final and Fifth ves-
tige of Realism that I want to raise in Prof. Dummett's work. Only
someone who is already convinced of realist doctrine, must take the
charge made here seriously. The final line of the first quote contains
as adequate an anti-realist answer as can be given to the worry in the
second (which is ten years later than the first. Had Prof. Dummett
forgotten his earlier, excellent treatment?). Indeed, if the anti-realist,
in this case the mathematical constructivist, holds firm to his own prin-
ciples, there is little the realist can do to find fault within his position:
its coherence seems perfectly safe. Personally, I think that also the re-
alist position is coherent, and that the well-known reasoning advanced
by Prof. Dummett, to the effect that it is not, does not succeed: in
spite of a fair number of try-outs, I have yet to meet the realist who be-
comes convinced by the Dummett argument and, in consequence, who
wants to give up his position. Worry and the feeling that there must
be something wrong with the argument is the standard first reaction,
rather than an abolition of a basic realist stance.51 Reflected reaction
50See [155], p. 285 (my boldface).
51
 This, however, might also be the intended effect of Prof. Dummett's argument.
See the preface to [50], p. xxxix:
I personally have no unshakeable commitment to anti-realism in any of
these cases, even the mathematical one. [...] I have urged the claims of
the anti-realist position only because it seemed to me that, in most cases,
philosophers unthinkingly adopted a realist view without noticing that it
required substantiation: to say it is natural to take such a view or that it is
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will consist in further refinement of positions, the sharpening of state-
ments, modifications with respect to other areas of discourse, etc., all the
while remaining faithful to the basic realist attitude originally adopted.
This state of affairs was diagnosed in one of the first substantial dis-
cussions of the realist/anti-realist debate, namely that of Fichte's Erste
Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, where Realism appears under the
guise of Dogmatism (Fichte was, of course, an idealist), and Anti-realism
is known as Idealism.52 Fichte's view, that neither participant in the de-
bate will ever succeed to refute the other, or to convince him that he had
better embrace the opposite position, is correct, I think. It is agreeable
to see that I am joined in this opinion by a very eminent protagonist
of the realist, ontologico-semantical school in the Philosophy of Logic,
namely the late Heinrich Scholz.53 Scholz quotes the defence offered by
Bertrand Russell:
My argument for the law of excluded middle and against the
definition of 'truth' in terms of 'verifiability' is not that it is
impossible to construct a system on this basis, but rather that
it is possible to construct a system on the opposite basis, and
that this wider system, which embraces unverifiable truths, is
necessary for the interpretation of beliefs which none of us, if
we were sincere, are prepared to abandon.54
Scholz then winds up his discussion with the following passage, which I
wholly endorse:
Gleichwohl muß eine solche Verteidigung wie die ganze klas-
sische Logik heute gefaßt sein auf Angriffe, die in einer mehr
oder weniger herausfordernden Sprache vorgetragen werden.
Demgegenüber kann nicht nachdrücklich genug daran erinnert
werden, daß auch die Krisenfestigkeit einer noch so konstruk-
tiven Logik, auf die hier Bezug genommen wird, in keinem Fall
den Charakter der Absolutheit für sich in Anspruch nehmen
kann. Absolute Krisenfestigkeit ist ein Idol, das nur bestehen
'part of our theory of the world' is merely the equivalent of Dr. Johnson's
kicking the stone.
52
 See [61].
53See [140], pp. 11-12, Springer, Berlin, 1961. The book was prepared for pub-
lication by Hasenjäger and Scholz's Vorwort and Einleitung are both particularly
interesting from the point of view of the realist/anti-realist debate.
54
 See [139], third edition, p. 682.
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kann vor einem Mangel an Selbstkritik. Hieraus folgt, daß es
eine objektive, allgemeinverbindliche Rangordung der Auffas-
sungen der Logik ein für allemal nicht gibt. Über einen Wettbe-
werb der Möglichkeiten, die überhaupt auf eine sinnvolle Art
zur Diskussion gestellt werden können, ist grundsätztlich nicht
hinauszukommen. Aus diesem Grunde ist es mit Bezug auf den
angedeuteten Spielraum angemessen, von der Logik zu sagen,
was FICHTE in einem denkwürdigen Falle von der Philosophie
überhaupt gesagt hat: "Was für eine Logik man wähle, hängt
davon ab, was für ein Mensch man ist".
This should not be taken as an expression of relativism: we are not free
to pick or choose. Only, there are no absolute grounds available to us
on which to found such a choice. The notion of correctness one would
need here, to decide which of the two positions is the right one, and,
indeed, even to make sense of the idea that a certain view is the right
view, comes close to the reciitudo dealt with by St. Anselm in his De
Veritate and which, on some views, would itself be the Absolute or God.
Returning now to the intuitionistic notion of truth and its timeless-
ness, one point we must answer is the well-known query as to the status
of mathematical truths prior to their being proved. For instance, was
Waring's Conjecture true also prior to Hubert's proof in the first decade
of this century? Martin-Löf has refined the above position on truth
by means of an application of a threefold Kantian distinction, whereby
objects get divided into logically possible, really possible and actual.55
As soon as a proposition A has been explained, that is, as soon as it
has been laid down what a proof-object for the proposition has to be, a
proof-object for the proposition A is a logically possible object and the
judgement
A is true,
that is, the judgement
the concept proof of A exists,
is logically possible. Thus, for instance, the judgement
55See [112].
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-L is true
is logically possible, since it has been laid down what counts as a proof
object of the absurdity _L. Obviously, it is not a really possible judge-
ment, since, in virtue of the meaning explanation in question, there exists
no proof-object for the absurdity _L, that is, proof-objects for the absur-
dity are logically possible, but not really possible.56 Finally, Hubert's
proof-object for Waring's Conjecture is actual and the judgement
Waring's Conjecture is true
is actual. Thus, for instance, for each natural number k, the judge-
ment
The proposition
k stones were used to erect the castle at Mussomeli
is true
is logically possible, and, for a certain m < ΙΟ100, the judgement sim-
pliciter
The proposition
m stones were used to erect the castle at Mussomeli
is true
will be really possible, but, as far as I know, not actual, since nobody
will have counted the stones actually used.
These distinctions will be inherited also for truth, where we can speak
of truth simpliciter^ potential truth, respectively, actual truth, according
to whether the existence of the proof-object in question is, logically
possible, really possible or actual. Thus, to a logically possible proof-
object corresponds the notion of truth simpliciter.
In order to get the terminology in terms of simpliciter, potential and
actual into perspective, let me carry out the discussion once more on
the level of judgements. When A is a proposition, we may consider the
judgement
56In the current, possible-worlds inspired, view of modality, the truth of absurdity
would not be held to be a logically possible option. The present notion is clearly a
different one from that of the possible worlds approach.
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that is,
A is true,
the concept of proof of A exists.
By the explanation offered previously, as soon as the category a has
been explained,
a exists
is a judgement simpliciier, irrespective of whether it can, or ever will,
become evident, or known. If it can become evident, that is, if an ob-
ject falling under this concept is not merely logically possible, but really
possible, then the judgement is potentially evident and finally when an
object falling under the concept not only can be found, but actually
has been found, the judgement is actually evident. Via the explication
of truth as existence of proof-object, the notion of truth simpliciter of
a proposition A corresponds to the logical possibility of proof-objects.
When the judgement simpliciter
A is true
is potentially evident (when it can become known), that is, when a
proof-object is really possible, the proposition A is potentially true. Fi-
nally, when the judgement is actually evident (known), the proposition
is actually true and a proof-object will have actual existence in virtue
of being known. This leads to the following correspondences with Prof.
Dummett's work.57
Martin- Löf
proof-object
logically possible
really possible
actual
notion of truth
simpliciter
potential
actual
type of judg.
simpliciter
knowable
known
Dummett
truth
justifiability
justifiedness
These distinctions can be used to account for a number of intricate
points in the philosophy of constructivism, among them the question
57See [54], in [18].The match is not perfect; Dummett's truth is a realist notion.
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concerning the temporal status of the truth of Waring's Conjecture. To
repeat: was Waring's Conjecture true also prior to Hubert's proof? Con-
cerning potential truth the correct answer is: the question is senseless,
since the notion of existence involved is timeless. For actual truth, prior
to Hubert's proof, the answer, obviously, must be no.
Similarly — a point raised above with respect to the truth-condition
for disjunction — the T-sentence clause
AV B is true
iff
A is true or B is true
holds for potential, but not actual, truth.
As a final example consider yet another of Prof. Dummett's discus-
sions of implication:58
In some very vague intuitive sense one might say that the in-
tuitionistic connective —*· was stronger than the classical —»·.
This does not mean that the intuitionistic statement A —»·
B is stronger than the classical A —»· B, for intuitively the
antecedent of the intuitionistic conditional is also stronger.
The classical antecedent is such that A is true, irrespective of
whether we can recognise it as such or not. Intuitionistically,
this is unintelligible: the intuitionistic antecedent is that A is
intuitionistically provable, and this is a stronger assumption.
We have to show that we could prove B on the supposition,
not merely that A happens to be the case (an intuitionistically
meaningless supposition), but that we have been given a proof
of A.
The italicized phrase will have to be understood as referring to the pos- ι
sibility of transforming proof-objects. That is, one must give a uniform j
way of obtaining a proof-object for B in terms of a proof-object for j
A. How this works can best be seen in working out a simple example, f
Proofs of conjunctions are pairs and their respective components can be
extracted using projection functions. In a proof of Α Λ ~Ά, the first com-
ponent will be a proof of A and the second component will be a proof of
~>A, that is, a function transforming proofs of A into proofs of JL There-
fore, application of the second component to the first will yield a proof
58See [47], pp. 16-17, (my italics).
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of X. Hence, in this fashion we have provided a uniform method for how
to find a proof for the absurdity, given a proof of Α Λ ->Α, and so we
have proved the implication of the second from the first. A more formal
representation of the above reasoning would be: p(z) : A and q(z) : ->A,
on the supposition ζ : Af\-*A. Hence, <zp(g(z),p(z)) : J_ (where ap(x,y)
is the application function), still on the same supposition. Therefore,
\z.ap(q(z},p(z}) : (Α Λ ~·Α) -+ l,
now on no supposition, and the truth of the proposition has accord-
ingly been established, through the construction of this proof-object.
Note however that the antecedent is an empty set; no proof-object of
the proposition Α Λ ->Α can ever be found. This is a false proposition.
The italicised part of Prof. Dummett's passage can also be read in a
different way, namely as involving the supposition that I have obtained
a proof-object for the antecedent. This would be represented as the sup-
position that I had proved the judgement α : Α Λ -ιΑ, for a suitable a,
that is, that I had carried out a proof-act having this judgement as its
object, and, in the case just discussed, this is an impossible situation.
I shall never find myself in the situation of having found a proof-object
for the proposition A/\ -<A.59 Therefore, to sum up: the notion of truth
involved in the clause
A —»· Β is true
iff
Β is true, provided A is true
is that of truth simpliciter, that is, the notion of existence of a proof-
object, applied to the propositions in question, independently of whether
a proof-object can ever be found. For potential truth, nonsense will
sometimes result, for instance, in such cases where the antecedent is
false. (Thus, also in the case discussed above of the truth-clause for
disjunction, it seems best to let the notion of truth involved be that of
truth simpliciter, rather than that of potential truth, though the latter
59
 Note that what is involved here is the difference between the supposition that a
proposition is true, which is expressed by means of a free variable for a proof-object,
and the supposition that the truth of the proposition has been established by means
of a proof-object, which is represented through the use of a closed term for the proof-
object, depending on no variable assumptions, and where what is assumedis that an
act has been carried out rather than that a proposition is true.
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does not make nonsense out of the clause in question.)
With this example my tour of Michael's work has come to an end. My
examination has been largely critical, so I very much want to conclude
by borrowing a leaf from the Preface to his Truth and Other Enigmas,
where, concerning his critical study of Goodman's The Structure of Ap-
pearance, he states that he hopes it is obvious that he would not have
spent so much time and effort on something which he did not hold in
the highest esteem. The same holds for myself regarding his own work.
Above I applied the Berlin hedgehog/fox terminology to Martin-Lof,
who is a hedgehog, who knows that he is a hedgehog. It is equally clear
that Michael is a fox, who knows that he is a fox, and what a pleasure
it is to accompany him on his wanderings through the thorny paths of
anti-realism.
University of Leiden
R E P L Y T O S U N D H O L M
I should be surprised if there were not many vestiges of realism in my
writings. A hedgehog, who knows one big thing and sticks to it, can
keep himself uncontaminated by alien thoughts; but a fox, who goes
snuffling around among the many things about each of which he knows
a little, is bound to pick up variegated ideas not consistent with one
another. We are all of us brought up to view the world in a realist
manner, and it is difficult for us foxes to shake off all the effects of that
upbringing. More exactly, I believe that there are several features of
our language, and therefore of the way we learn to think, that push us
to take the first steps towards realism, and was attempting to explore
one of these in one of the papers Sundholm quotes (The Source of the
Concept of Truth). These features are, in my view, to be respected, not
eliminated as defects; it is a test of any version of anti-realism that it
can accommodate them without degenerating into full-blown realism. I
therefore view it as misleading that Sundholm should remark (footnote
57) that the notion of truth employed in that paper is a realist one.
It was not intended to be a specific or full-grown notion at all: only
a newborn infant in which we can discern the future lineaments of a
realist conception, but which, given a proper upbringing, still might
develop into a viable constructivist one.
My intention is not to defend myself from the charge of having ex-
pressed thoughts heretical by the canons of constructivist orthodoxy, but
to explore what strikes me as a deep disagreement between Sundholm
and me: over the distinction between a proposition and a judgement
or assertion. Certainly the two are very different. A judgement or an
assertion is, as Sundholm says, an act: a proposition is the content of
such an act — the content of an actual or possible judgement —- and,
as such, may be regarded as an object, if one of a very special kind.
This distinction was first clearly drawn, and in almost these terms, by
Frege in his Begriffsschrift. How, then, does the distinction bear on the
concept of truth? In a brief unpublished fragment of 1915, Frege wrote:
One can only say: the word 'true' has a sense, but one that
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contributes nothing to the sense of the whole sentence in which
it occurs as a predicate.
But it is just in virtue of this that this word appears to be suited
to indicate the essence of logic. Every other property-word
would be less suited to do this, because of its specific sense. The
word 'true' thus seems to make the impossible possible: namely
to make what corresponds to the assertoric force appear as a
contribution to the thought. And, although it miscarries, or,
rather, precisely through its miscarrying, this attempt points
to the special character of logic ... (Nachgelassene Schriften, p.
272, Posthumous Writings, p. 252.)
Why is using the concept of truth attempting the impossible? Well,
what is the difference between a proposition and a judgement? When
we express a proposition, we do not thereby adopt any stance towards
its truth or falsity: but, when we make or express a judgement, we are
assigning truth to the proposition we express. We can, and often must,
express a proposition without ever feigning to judge it true, as when
we ask whether it is true, or when we assert a complex proposition of
which it is a constituent part. So it appears that judging is ascribing
the property of truth to a proposition. But, if we attempt to express
the property so ascribed by means of the predicate 'is true', in the way
that every other property can be expressed by a suitable predicate, the
predicate we have framed fails to do what was required of it. What
was required was to convert the mere expression of a proposition into a
judgement whose content it was. But when we transform the expression
of a proposition, say 'π is transcendental', into a statement of its truth
— 'it is true that ν is transcendental' — we have not succeeded in
expressing a judgement: we merely have, once more, the expression of
a proposition — of the very same proposition as before, according to
Frege — as is shown by the fact that our new sentence can be put into
interrogative form or used as the antecedent of a conditional.
If we wish to symbolise what is distinctive of a judgement — or
of an assertion, the communication of a judgement — to mark it off
from the mere expression of a proposition, we cannot therefore employ
a predicate: we must use a sign that does not contribute, or purport
to contribute, to the content of the proposition. That is precisely the
function of Frege's assertion sign: it symbolises, not any constituent of
the proposition, after whose sense it would be meaningful to enquire,
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but the assertoric force attached to the proposition in making an as-
sertion whose content that proposition is. Sundholm expresses what he
terms a 'judgement/assertion' in the form 'A is true' (p. 141); we must
accordingly view him as using 'is true', not as a predicate properly so
called, but as the equivalent of Frege's assertion sign. So far, then, the
distinction between a proposition A and the judgement expressed by 'A
is true' is clear and incontrovertible.
Propositions are objects, judgements are acts. What is the difference
between an object and an act? Well, one can talk about objects, that
is, frame propositions concerning them; but it does not make sense to
speak of performing them. An act, on the other hand, is, pre-eminently,
something that can be performed. One can also convey that one is
performing it or has performed it. Presumably, one can also talk about
an act; but neither performing it nor conveying that one has performed
it is a case of saying something about it, but is an activity of quite
different kind. A proposition is, however, the content of a judgement or
of an assertion, and so one can do something with a proposition other
than talk about it: namely, one can assert it or judge it true (where here
'true' is as much an integral part of the verb as is 'down' in the phrase
'track him down').
Sundholm immediately takes a further step. He distinguishes between
constructions which constitute proofs of propositions, and to which we
refer when explaining the meanings of propositions, and proofs of judge-
ments, which are 'that through which one gets to know the truth of a
proposition'. The former, he tells us, are objects, but the latter are not
objects, but acts. Hence, he says, "the form of the theorem proved by
the act of proof, when fully elucidated, will be 'c is a proof of A', where
c is the construction found in the act of construction/proof'. Thus 'c is
a proof of A' no more symbolises a proposition than does 'A is true'; it,
too, communicates the performance of an act. Accordingly, 'is a proof
of' is no more a relational expression than 'is true' is a predicate: the
assertion 'c is a proof of A' cannot allow of being contradicted by 'c is
not a proof of A', or being placed in the antecedent of a conditional,
any more than the negation sign can be placed in front of the assertion
sign, or the latter taken to govern only the antecedent of a conditional.
What are we to make of this? Can we accommodate it within the
general framework of the distinction between propositions and judge-
ments, as it has here been drawn? Well, we not only make assertions,
but indicate the kind of basis on which we make them: we say, 'I see
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that A', 'I remember that A', 'I conclude that A', and so on. When we
say such things, we are not telling our hearers how it is with us, but, in
each case, asserting that A while indicating on what basis we are doing
so. Likewise, when I see something, remember something or infer some-
thing, I do not judge that my visual experience, memory-experience or
reasoning process warrants my judging that A: I simply judge that A,
t on the basis of what I see, remember or infer. Nor is a judgement that
such-and-such is good evidence that A, or a sound ground for accepting
A as true, a necessary preliminary to judging that A. On the contrary,
we make no such preliminary judgement, in the normal case at least: we
simply recognise the evidence or ground as warranting the judgement,
and make the judgement accordingly. We may thus regard Sundholm's
'c is a proof of A' as expressing an assertion of A accompanied by an
explicit indication of the basis for the assertion; 'c is a proof of' func-
tions as an assertion sign with index c to indicate on the basis of what
construction the proposition is being asserted.
It appears, nevertheless, that this use of 'is a proof of' as a qualified
sign of assertoric force cannot be the only use of the expression Sund-
holm must allow. He quotes the standard explanation of the conditional
j proposition A —* B as being that f is a proof of it just in case f(a) is
a proof of B, provided a is a proof of A (p. 149). Even if we take A
and B as specific propositions, the letter a must be a variable over con-
structions. It seems, therefore, that in this situation the expression 'is a
proof of' must be a genuine relational expression, standing for a relation
between constructions and propositions, and not a sign indicating force,
for two reasons: (i) it figures in the antecedent of a conditional; and
(ii) it has a variable term in one of its argument-places. The reason (i)
appears conclusive, since we have already noted that a force-indicator
cannot stand within the scope of a sentential operator. The reason (ii)
seems equally compelling. If 'a : A' conveys a judgement, then A must
be a specific proposition and a a specific ground for the assertion: there
is no such thing as asserting an indeterminate proposition or as asserting
a determinate proposition on an indeterminate ground. If this conclu-
sion is correct, it can only be rated a bad idea to have one and the same
expression playing two such different roles, however closely related they
may be; that is too great an encouragement to confusion.
Both of these grounds may be countered, however. Ground (i) may be
rebutted by the plea that the stipulation is not really itself a conditional
proposition, but a lax formulation of a rule. Clearly 'is a proof of' is
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the informal equivalent of the colon in Martin-Löf's notation, 'c : A'
being the expression of a judgement that A on the basis of the construc-
tion c. The rule in question is then the elimination rule stating that,
given the judgements 'f : A—*B' and 'a : A', one is entitled to make
the judgement 'f(a) : B'. (This would be an example of the meaning
of a logical constant's being given by the elimination rule governing it;
but I shall not enter into this controversy here.) It remains that in all
such stipulations, the symbols for constructions — here f and a -— are
variables. That is the necessary characteristic of the statement of any
general rule: variables are required in order to express the generality. In
Frege's formulations of his rules of inference, for example, he uses the i
assertion sign for premisses and conclusion because an inferential step
must lead from asserted premisses to an asserted conclusion: but it is
followed, not by symbols for any actual propositions ('names of truth-
values'), but by Greek capital letters indicating arbitrary propositions.
One cannot object that it is impossible to assert an indeterminate propo- '
sition. In stating the rules of inference, Frege is not making assertions,
but talking about assertions that may be made: it is noteworthy that
he is careful to enclose the whole, assertion sign and a capital Greek
letter, in quotation marks. We may not only perform an act of judge- l
ment, and convey to others that we have performed it: we can also frame
propositions and lay down stipulations concerning the making of acts of
judgement. Acts are thus objects as well, in the sense ofthat which we
can speak and think about. In so doing, we may use the expressions
intended to convey acts of judgement, but in tacit or explicit quotation
marks, not as conveying them, but as indicating what we are talking
about; and we may legitimately quantify into the expressions so used.
We should not then confuse the colon or the phrase 'is a proof of' with a
genuine predicate, when it merely contributes to indicating a judgement
of which we are predicating something.
A mathematical proposition partitions mathematical constructions
into those that are and those that are not proofs of it; it therefore
determines a unique set of constructions, those, namely, that prove it.
Can it be identified with this set? Not if set-membership is a relation, as
we normally conceive it as being: a construction is a member of the set,
but a ground for asserting the proposition. The equation of propositions
with sets is thus not explanatory of the notion of a proposition, since it
requires a transformation of our ordinary notion of a set, namely into i
what we should ordinarily think of as the proposition that the set has
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a member. A construction that proves this proposition is an object
that can be recognised as a member of the set; the execution of this
construction — the proof-act whereby we arrive at the corresponding
judgement — will be the production of such an object. Where α is
the set, the judgement whose content is the proposition with which it
is thus identified can therefore be written as 'a exists' (meaning '0 is
inhabited'), and its 'fully elucidated' form as 'a :<*', where a is a member
of the set a, just as Sundholm says (p. 156). On this understanding
of the notion of a set, set-membership is indeed not a relation, but a
ground of judgement; to arrive at such an understanding, we must start
with the constructive notion of a proposition.
So far, then, Sundholm's use of the Martin-Löfian terminology and
apparatus seems entirely coherent. We may not be happy with the use of
an apparent predicate like 'is true' and an apparent relational expression
like 'is a proof of' as force-indicators, but, as long as we bear in mind
what they are meant to be, that is no more than an awkwardness. As it
seems to me, it is when Sundholm starts discussing the notion of truth
that things start to go awry. The first point to note is that, even if the
foregoing arguments failed, the distinction between proof-objects and
proof-acts requires that there is, after all, a sense of 'is a proof of' under
which it is a genuine expression for a relation. For, if a proposition is
an object, and a construction is an object, they are both things of the
right sort for a relation to obtain between them; and, if so, how can it be
denied that one such relation that, may obtain consists in the construc-
tion's being a proof of the proposition? A construction is an object: the
corresponding act is the carrying out of that construction. How are we
to understand this? Is it like saying, 'A house is an object, but building
a house is an act'? It does not seem so. For there are no unbuilt houses,
whereas it seems that there are constructions that have not been carried
out. Consider what Sundholm first says about the constructivist notion
of truth (p. 155). He begins by stating that a proposition is true just
in case there exists a proof of it, and then asks whether 'proof' here
should be taken to mean a proof-act or a proof-object. To answer this,
he considers the principle that the proposition A V B is true if and only
if either A is true or B is true. If, in the characterisation of 'is true', we
take 'proof' to mean 'proof-act', Sundholm argues, that intuitively com-
pelling principle will fail, since it is well known that a valid constructive
proof of A VB may be carried out, even though no such proof has been
carried out either of A or of B. He concludes that we must interpret
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'proof' to mean 'proof-object': the clear implication is that, under this
interpretation, the principle will hold. If it does, then, in the case con-
sidered, that a constructive proof has been given of A VB, without any
such proof's having been given either of A or of B, a proof-object either
for A or for B must exist, that is, a construction that proves either
one or the other, even though, by hypothesis, no such construction has
been carried out. There must, therefore, exist constructions that have
not been carried out, whereas there do not exist houses that have never
been built.
What is the sense of 'exists' in accordance with which a construction
or proof-object may exist even though it has not been carried out? A
constructively acceptable proof of a disjunctive proposition A V B will
provide an effective means of constructing a proof either of A or of Β,
although, if it was not a canonical proof, we shall not know in advance of
carrying out the construction which of the two propositions it will prove.
So perhaps a construction of a given kind may be said to exist if we have
an effective means of carrying it out, whether or not we have carried it
out. This is, however, still a temporal notion, since we acquire such an
effective means only at a certain point in time, not having possessed
it previously, whereas we subsequently learn from Sundholm (p. 163)
that the relevant notion of existence is to be a timeless one; so this
explanation will not serve.
Sundholm indeed hastens to comment on the sense in which he is
using 'exists', explaining that "the notion of existence involved cannot
be that of the existential quantifier" (p. 156). But what is he doing at
all, in attempting, from a constructivist standpoint, to characterise the
notion of truth? On the face of it, he is attempting to lay down the
condition for a proposition to be true. But, if 'is true' is construed, as
we previously concluded that it must be, not as a predicate of propo-
sitions, but as a misleading form of the assertion sign, it is nonsensical
— quite literally ungrammatical — to frame sentences of the form 'The
proposition A is true if and only if ... '. You cannot simultaneously
assert a proposition and state its equivalence with another proposition;
you cannot put the assertion sign within the scope of the sentential con-
nective 'if and only if'. In any case, A is a variable here, and you cannot
assert an indeterminate or variable proposition. Well, the fact that A
is a variable shows, as we have seen, that we are not here making or
communicating any judgements, but talking about them. And though to
make a judgement is not to predicate anything of it, we can predicate of
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a judgement that it is or is not warranted, and lay down the condition
for it to be warranted. That is so, indeed; but whether a judgement
is warranted depends upon the epistemic condition of the subject who
makes the judgement; when the judgement is a mathematical one, the
condition is that the subject knows that the appropriate proof-act has
occurred — that such an act exists in a perfectly ordinary sense of 'ex-
ists' — that is, that the appropriate construction, in Sundholm's sense
of a construct!vistically acceptable proof, has actually been carried out.
There is then no reason to suppose that, whenever a judgement of the
form 'AV B is true' will be warranted, either the judgement 'A is true'
or the judgement 'B is true' will be warranted; so, if this is what we are
talking about, no objection can be raised on this ground to speaking of
a proof-act rather than a proof-object.
In this respect, however, the notion of being warranted differs from
that of being true, which, as commonly understood, is an objective con-
dition independent of the state of the subject, who may, through luck,
make a true assertion even though he was not warranted in making it.
Can we not, therefore, construe 'the proposition A is true', in the con-
text 'The proposition A is true if and only if there exists a proof of A',
as meaning 'the judgement "A is true" is correct', where the correct-
ness of an assertion is an objective condition independent of the state
of the subject? In ' "A is true" ', 'is true' functions as the assertion
sign, even though standing within quotation marks; but the notion of
the correctness of an assertion can be equated with that of the truth
of the proposition asserted, where now truth is a genuine property of
propositions. Now may we not need such a notion as that of objective
correctness or objective truth? The realist certainly needs it: it is of
the very essence of his conception. Possibly, a constructivist may need a
corresponding notion also. But that requires to be made out, and cannot
be simply assumed: on the face of it, the constructivist appears to be
able to get on very happily without it; indeed its introduction is going to
cause him some awkwardness. Even to raise the question, 'How are we
to characterise the constructivist notion of truth?', gives the impression
of supposing that the constructivist needs to have some notion of the
objective truth of a proposition, distinct from that of the existence of a
warrant for asserting it. With what right can that be presupposed?
But is Sundholm really presupposing this? May he not be expressing
himself in a misleading way, so that he is not really enquiring under
what conditions a proposition is true, but, accepting that 'A is true' is
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the general form of a judgement, or, rather, assertion, asking in what
equivalent way a judgement may, in general, be expressed? That, indeed,
is how it turns out, Sundholm explains (p. 156) that the notion of
existence appealed to in 'there exists a proof(-object) for A' is 'that of
the existence of a general concept'. When α is a general concept or
category, he says, then 'a exists' is (not a proposition but) a judgement.
We have here, then, an instance of the equation of sets, or, rather, in
this instance, of general concepts, with propositions. The concept proof-
object for A is to be equated with the proposition A: the judgement
'The concept proof-object for A exists' is then warranted by the actual
construction of a proof of A, just as is the judgement 'A is true'. We have
been given no explanation of 'is true' as used in 'A is true'; rather, our
prior understanding of the latter judgement is appealed to in explanation
of the judgement-form 'The concept proof-object for A exists'.
Even so, we may remain worried by the case of disjunctive judge-
ments. The judgement 'AV Β is true' is warranted by carrying out a
constructive proof of the proposition AV B; Sundholm is explicit that
this need not be a canonical proof. On the score that it is the existence
of proof-objects, not of proof-acts, that is in question, we are supposed
to be entitled to equate the judgement with 'A is true or B is true'.
But with what are we equating it here? If 'is true' is and remains a sign
of assertion, 'A is true or B is true' is simply ill-formed: you cannot
disjoin two judgements, but only two propositions. Perhaps what Sund-
holm means to say is that, if the judgement 'AVB is true' is warranted,
then either the judgement 'A is true' or the judgement 'B is true' is also
warranted. But, if the warrant for a judgement is the carrying out of
a construction of a proof-object for the proposition, then this is simply
not so: that, indeed, was the whole problem in the first place. We are
still left baffled by the notion of existence for proof-objects.
It is when Sundholm comes to apply the trichotomy of logically possi-
ble, really possible and actual (pp. 160-165) that my unease reaches the
peak. He starts by presenting this as a trichotomy of objects, but imme-
diately applies it to acts, in particular to judgements. He explains that,
'as soon as it has been laid down what a proof-object for [a] proposition
is to be', such a proof-object becomes a logically possible object, and a
judgement of its existence a logically possible judgement. For myself, I
should not be happy to call a proof that 2 + 2 = 5 a logically possible
object, let alone a proof of absurdity, of which it has been laid down that
nothing is to count as a proof. For any proposition of which we do not
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know a disproof, a proof of it may be called an (at present) epistemically
possible object, but it is an abuse of words to call it logically possible.
Sundholm further tells us that the trichotomy can be extended to truth,
allowing us to regard a proposition as true simpliciter, potentially true
or actually true according as its proof-object is logically possible, really
possible or actual (pp. 161-162). Is he now distinguishing grades of
truth, considered as attaching to propositions, or is he still regarding
'is true' only as an assertion sign, but continuing to use a misleading
terminology? In his argument about the meaning of implication (pp.
163-164), he says that the notion of truth involved in the specification
that A—*· B is true if and only if B is true, provided A is true, must be
truth simpliciter, since a proof-object for A may not be really possible.
If 'is true' is merely an assertion sign, this specification is misbegotten,
for the usual reasons: it needs reformulating as 'We shall have a war-
rant for the judgement "A—*· B is true" just in case we should have a
warrant for the judgement "B is true" provided that we had a warrant
for the judgement "A is true" '. Even this formulation does not appear
completely happy; it would be better stated as 'We shall have a warrant
for the judgement "A—* B is true" just in case we are in a position to ι
recognise that we should have a warrant for the judgement "B is true" j
provided that we had a warrant for the judgement "A is true" '. When |
it is reformulated in this way, it is evident that Sundholm's truth sim-
pliciter does not come into the matter at all. We shall not have a warrant
for the judgement 'A—*B is true' merely by recognising that the judge-
ment 'B is true' will be logically possible, provided that the judgement
'A is true' is logically possible. Given that it has been laid down what
is required of a construction for it to be a proof of the proposition A,
the judgement 'A is true' will be logically possible, on Sundholm's un-
derstanding of 'logically possible'; that is not what is required. We can,
however, recognise that, if we had actually constructed a proof-object
for A, we should be able to construct one for B, in advance of knowing
whether there is any real possibility of constructing one for A. It is not
any special sense of 'is true' that is in question; actual truth is all we
need to appeal to, but as hypothesis, not as categorically attributed.
The notion of truth simpliciter is clear, but is not a notion of truth at
all. The notion of actual truth is also clear, and, as Sundholm says (p.
163), is a temporal notion; as more is proved, so more becomes actually
true. It is the notion of potential truth, or of the really possible, that
is obscure. When is a construction really possible? Sundholm gives
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us very little help. He tells us (p. 161) that an (empirical) proof of
a proposition of the form 'k stones were used to erect the castle at
Mussomeli' is really possible, but probably not actual. He tells us (p.
163) that the existence of a really possible proof-object is timeless. He
cannot be meaning merely to say that the assertion sign has no tense,
since that would not help us to distinguish potential from actual truth,
or real possibility from actuality. He tells us also that the disjunction
principle discussed above is valid for potential, though not for actual,
truth. Prom these hints, I am unable to gather what real possibility is.
It is the problem of the existence of proof-objects over again. Plainly, it
is in this notion that we find a vestige of realism in Sundholm's thinking;
and it has neither been clearly explained nor made out that any such
notion is needed.
I should prefer to say that a constructive mathematician has no need
of any notion of truth distinct both from the assertion sign and from
the notion of a warrant for assertion. That is not to say that I do not
respect Sundholm's struggles with the concept of truth. On the contrary,
I do not believe that a constructive approach to propositions about non-
mathematical reality can dispense with the concept of truth; that is why
it must involve a vestige of realism.
I have some other cavils with what Sundholm has written. In par-
ticular, I cannot believe the opposition between realism and idealism to
be irresoluble, although it may never be resolved to everyone's actual
satisfaction. I also have no faith in the general possibility of recognis-
ing proofs of mathematical propositions am Symbol allein, which has so
much taken Sundholm; I think that the ideal of dispensing with under-
standing in this regard is a fantasy. But the important matter was the
concept of truth, which is why, though I apologise for having discussed
it at such length, I cannot regret doing so.
R E P L Y T O W R I G H T
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 See [50], p. 200.
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Crispin Wright's discussion of my paper on Gödel's incompleteness the-
orem has the great merit of linking the principal topic of that with the
more celebrated thesis of Lucas, recently endorsed by Penrose. In my
paper I did not refer to Lucas's work, unsurprisingly since his original
paper on the subject was published in the same year as mine; but I came
close to endorsing his view, saying:
it may be the case that no formal system can ever succeed in
embodying all the principles of proof that we should intuitively
accept; and this is precisely what is shown to be the case in
regard to number theory by Gödel's theorem.1
Obviously, a formal system that would mimic all the actual proofs of
number-theoretic propositions we have ever accepted or ever shall accept
is a fantasy. The difficulty is that on which Wright remarks (p. 172),
that of making clear what we are talking about when we speak of 'the
powers of the human mind'; the idea was that, at the end of human
history, it would be possible in theory to go through all number-theoretic
proofs we had accepted and isolate the basic assumptions and principles
of reasoning appealed to in them. Principles of proof may be divided
into (1) those we currently accept; (2) those we shall come to accept;
(3) those we should be disposed to accept if anyone had hit on them
(or if an angel from heaven had expounded them); and (4) those we
should never accept. The quoted observation is hasty. Plainly, if a
formal system embodied all the principles in categories (1) and (2), and
perhaps in (3) as well, but also embodied some in category (4), we should
not recognise it as sound, and hence presumably should not acknowledge
it as consistent; we should therefore have no reason to accept as true
the Gödel undecidable sentence for such a system. The most that could
be claimed is that there could be no formal system embodying all the
principles in categories (1) and (2), without embodying any in category
(4)-
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